Former CIA officer John Kiriakou has made startling revelations regarding the United States’ handling of Abdul Qadeer Khan, often referred to as the "father of Pakistan’s nuclear program" and one of the world’s most notorious nuclear proliferators. In an exclusive interview with ANI, Kiriakou, who spent 15 years working as the CIA’s chief of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, disclosed that the U.S. had ample opportunity to eliminate AQ Khan but ultimately chose not to, influenced significantly by Saudi Arabia’s intervention.
Kiriakou explained that if the U.S. had adopted an approach similar to Israel’s—which has a history of decisively eliminating perceived nuclear threats—they would have simply taken out AQ Khan. According to Kiriakou, Khan was “easy enough to find” since American intelligence knew where he lived and how he spent his daily routine. Despite this intelligence, the U.S. refrained from direct action. The reason, Kiriakou revealed, was that Saudi Arabia, which had close ties with AQ Khan and Pakistan, requested America to “leave him alone.” The Saudis reportedly assured the U.S. that they were working hand-in-hand with Khan and valued their relationship with Pakistan, thereby discouraging any aggressive U.S. moves against Khan.
This intervention, Kiriakou asserted, was a grave mistake on the part of the U.S. government. He criticized the American decision to prioritize Saudi diplomacy over confronting Khan head-on, contrasting it with Israel’s willingness to eliminate nuclear threats without hesitation. Khan’s illicit nuclear proliferation activities have had far-reaching consequences, as he was responsible for helping countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea develop nuclear weapons capabilities. In light of this, Kiriakou’s comments highlight a controversial chapter in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, where geopolitical considerations and alliances seemingly overrode decisive action against one of the most dangerous figures in global nuclear security.
Beyond his revelations about AQ Khan, Kiriakou made another significant claim regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. When he was stationed in Pakistan in 2002, Kiriakou said he was unofficially informed that the Pentagon controlled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. According to this information, then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had allegedly handed over control of the nuclear arsenal to the United States. However, this narrative changed in the years that followed. Pakistani officials and military leaders have since categorically denied any U.S. involvement in controlling their nuclear weapons, asserting that Pakistani generals maintain full authority over the arsenal. Kiriakou acknowledged this shift in the story, emphasizing that while the initial reports suggested U.S. control, the reality was that Pakistan retained independent command of its nuclear forces.
John Kiriakou’s background adds weight to his statements. He served in the CIA for 15 years, primarily focusing on counterterrorism operations in Pakistan—a region critical to U.S. national security interests. In 2007, Kiriakou became widely known after he blew the whistle on the CIA’s use of torture in interrogations. In a nationally televised interview, he confirmed that the agency was engaging in torture tactics, a revelation that sparked significant controversy and debate about U.S. counterterrorism policies. Although Kiriakou faced legal repercussions and spent 23 months in prison on charges related to leaking classified information, he has stood by his decision. He has publicly stated that he has “no regrets, no remorse” and believes he “did the right thing” by exposing the agency’s practices.
Kiriakou’s disclosures about AQ Khan and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal add to the complex and often secretive history of nuclear proliferation and counterproliferation efforts. The case of AQ Khan is particularly significant because he was central to the spread of nuclear technology beyond Pakistan, enabling several rogue states and non-state actors to advance their nuclear programs. The U.S. decision not to take direct action against him, especially given the intelligence available, raises questions about the interplay of international diplomacy, intelligence operations, and national security priorities.
Furthermore, the Saudi government’s reported protection of Khan underscores the intricate web of alliances and strategic interests that influence global nuclear policy. Saudi Arabia’s insistence that the U.S. leave Khan alone suggests that the kingdom valued its relationship with Pakistan and its nuclear capabilities, possibly as a counterbalance in regional geopolitics. This dynamic illustrates how nuclear non-proliferation efforts can be complicated by regional power considerations and